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The Consumer and New Labour: The consumer as king? 
‘Traditionally the left turned its back on choice as the preserve of the right. In a 
consumer society where the consumer is king, vacating this political terrain is not a 
feasible strategy for progressive politics’ (Alan Milburn, 2004 quoted in Joint 
Ministerial Memorandum, 2005: 1)  
 
1. Introduction: New Labour and Framing 
‘The figure of the consumer’, Vidler and Clarke  have written, ‘stands at the heart of 
New Labour's approach to the reform and modernisation of public services’.  
Consumerism, that is  ‘the commitment to organising services around a public 
understood as consumers of services’  emerged after 2000 as the central motif in the 
Blair Government’s  narrative, ‘a generic organizing principle for public service reform  
(Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 19, 20. See also Clarke et al, 2007). What were the main 
elements of New Labour’s consumer narrative? Why was it adopted and so 
vigorously propounded? To what extent did it amount to a major break with past 
Labour (and traditional social democratic) thinking?   
A key objective of this chapter is to elucidate New Labour’s understanding of 
‘consumerism’.  In so doing it shall draw heavily on Schon and Rein concept  of  the 
frame.  Frames   can be understood as  analytical devices which supply order and 
intelligibility to a complex, ever-shifting and confusing world (Schon and Rein, 1994). 
The first part of the chapter, after a brief sketch of the concept of ‘framing’,  consists 
of a discussion of what shall be called New Labour’s ‘diagnostic frame,’ that is the 
way   the way it defined the problem of ‘modernising’ the public services (for reasons 
of both space and political saliency, we focus on education and healthcare). The next 
section considers New Labour’s ‘prescriptive frames’, that is to say its major policy 
prescriptions which emerged from this diagnosis, The final section  explores 
ambiguities and problems within New Labour’s consumerist narrative. 
In this chapter  I draw upon documentary research (government papers of 
various types and ministerial policy speeches ) and a series of interviews  conducted 
mainly between 2004 and 2007  The people interviewed include former government 
ministers,  former  government advisors and MPs and clinicians.  Some were on the 
record but mostly off (for a list see Shaw, 2007).   
A central organising principle of the New Labour approach to public policy is 
its repudiation of ‘ideological thinking’. It  believed in    approaching issues ‘without 
ideological preconceptions’  and  searching  for practical solutions ‘through honest 
well constructed and pragmatic policies' (Blair and Schroder 1999). It made decisions  
it claimed) on the grounds of the merits of the case and the feasibility of all  policy  
options grounded in a  scrupulous investigation of  their  likely consequences. As the 
mantra had it,  ‘what matters is what works’, whatever a policy’s ideological 
provenance.   
It is true that New Labour displayed a willingness to experiment, to look at 
issues with fresh eyes, to challenge received willingness and to sweep aside the 
barnacles of past belief. To this extent it was, indeed, ‘non-ideological’. But is it 
possible to adopt an approach that is wholly practical and  solely-evidence based?  I 
would suggest not.  For example, how does one know ‘what works’? Given 
uncertainty, imperfect information, constraints of time and analytical capacity  - as 
well as  the sheer press of events -  there is (as one senior government policy 
advisor noted)   ‘inevitably some reliance on presumptions about what works best’ 
(interview, Chris Ham,  2007).  As Jack Straw put the matter: all politicians need   a 
‘framework of belief so that there is some template for the scores of individual 
decisions which they have to make every day’ (Straw, 1998). To explicate the Blair 
Government’s ‘framework of belief’  and its ‘presumptions about what works best’ I 
shall draw upon Schon and Rein’s concept of the frame.  Frames, they contend,  
‘select for attention a few salient features and relations from what would otherwise be 
an overwhelmingly complex reality’. It may be possible, through assembling a body of  
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data, to identify the most salient characteristics of a problem (say uneven educational 
performance)  but arriving at an agreed diagnosis of why it occurs, specifying the key 
variables and the relationship amongst them, defining causal sequences and so forth 
all presuppose the application of  frames - whether explicitly or implicitly. ‘The very 
task of making sense of complex, information-rich situations requires an operation of 
selectivity and organisation, which is what framing means’ (Schon and Rein, 1994: 
30).  By constructing analytical sequences and narratives illuminating why social ills  
or problems arise,  frames indicate which  types of policy responses are likely to be  
most effective. For analytical purposes, it is therefore  useful to differentiate between 
the diagnostic  and prescriptive aspects of  frames. The diagnostic refers to the  
definition and   elucidation of the causes of a problem and the  prescriptive to the 
policy remedies formulated to remedy it.   
A  major aim of this chapter will be to examine New Labour reframing, that is 
the new ideas, concepts and modes of thinking it utilised to explicate too its own 
satisfaction the problems it confronted. A  distinction is made between two sources of 
reframing, which shall be called  policy learning and social narrative formation. Policy 
learning has been defined ‘as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in response to past experience and new information’ (Hall, 1993: 278). 
Typically, it takes the form of an attempt to identify and draw conclusions  from the 
experience of past policy failures.  By social narrative formation I mean a particular 
way of understanding the new challenges posed by the process of social change and 
therefore the type of policy responses required. 
 
2. New Labour Diagnostic Frames: (a) Policy learning  
The starting point for  policy learning is the  perceived  inability of established 
policy recipes to resolve current policy problems.  New Labour policy learning (we 
shall suggest)  took place in two phases with the assumption of power in 1997 the 
dividing line. The initial phase  took the form of drawing lessons from both the 
perceived policy failures in Labour government in the 1960s and 1970s and repeated 
electoral failures after 1979.  Very briefly, the conclusions were that, in government,  
the party had been too attached to an  archaic,  musty and dogma-derived policy 
repertoire and  too much in thrall to ‘producer interests’ – notably public sector 
unions, professional associations and public bureaucracies whilst in opposition it had  
become wholly disconnected from public opinion and had lost touch with economic, 
social and political realties.  
.But if the new Government, in 1997, had a sense of what had, in the past, 
failed it l lacked a clear programme of action. This was notably the case with the 
running of the public services. Later key New Labour figures were to express regret 
that it had not been much bolder and more radical - by which  they meant embarked 
more rapidly and energetically on the competition and consumer choice agenda  
(interview, senior policy advisor, 2007). There  were a variety of reasons for this. 
Firstly, Labour had for  so many  years had campaigned against  Tory ‘marketisation’   
and ‘privatisation’ in the public services that it felt impelled to take such measures as 
‘abolishing the internal market’ – though in fact the steps it took fell short of this.  
Secondly, a number of ministers (notably Frank Dobson at Health) would have 
resisted a market-oriented reform programme. Thirdly, there was a widespread belief  
that a ‘third way’ could be found between the marketising approach favoured by the 
Tories and the tradition of centralised, top-down service delivery associated with 
Labour in the past based on partnership and collaborative working. Fourthly, public 
sector reform was not regarded as a top  priority in Labour’s first term.  Hence, in 
general, the policy tone in both healthcare and education was, for most of Labour’s 
first term, one of cautious incrementalism and limited experimentation.  
But within a couple of years key policy actors – notably the Prime Minister 
himself and a coterie of senior health and education advisers in Number 10, such as 
Andrew Adonis, Michael Barber,  Simon Stevens and Julian Le Grand –  reached the 
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conclusion that more drastic measures were needed.  Until 2000 policy had been 
overshadowed  by the commitment to abide by the Tories very tight spending 
settlement but with the new millennium the sluice gates of spending were opened.  
Would the new funds which flooded in be used to good effect – or would they – as 
Blair and his top aides feared – be squandered? If far more taxpayers’ money  more 
was spent and there was little to show for it, in terms of policy outcomes, then the 
case for   strong  public service might well be irreparably damaged in the public eye.  
Simon Stevens Downing Street’s senior health policy advisor at the time recalled: 
‘the terms of debate changed dramatically as  the issue of getting value for 
money assumed decisive  importance. The period between 2000 and 2002 
was pivotal for it became   increasingly clear that the additional resources 
made available were not being translated into more operations and falling 
waiting times. The system was  absorbing cash without producing results. 
Hence new incentives were needed’ (interview, 2006). 
Key policy-makers concluded that whilst the  ‘command and control’ regime 
Labour reasserted in 1997  may have been necessary to offer immediate relief on 
such matters as incredibly long  waiting times it   afforded no long-term solution. 
‘There was a perception,’ Stevens’ successor as Number 10 health policy advisor 
Julian Le Grand  recollected, ‘ that command and control had reached its limits’  
(interview, Le Grand, 2006).   ‘There was only so much you could achieve’, Milburn 
observed, ‘by finger-wagging and instructions.  We had to move to a system that was 
sustainable in its own right’ (interview, 2006).  Indeed keen Blairite reformers came 
to conclude that the real Tory failing was not that it had embarked on market-oriented 
reforms but had done so with  insufficient verve and determination (interview  
Milburn, 2006).   
In effect what was occurring was a major alteration in Labour diagnostic 
frame. The way it defined the problem of public service underperformance – and 
hence the prescriptions it found more compelling – shifted. Central to traditional 
Labour thinking has been the concept of market failure – the inability of market to 
meet social needs and distribute resources and life-chances in an equitable 
manner.  The Blair Government  agreed that this problem persisted but, equally, 
became convinced of the no less important dangers posed by public sector failure 
– a problem (it felt) ‘Old Labour’  had so emphatically  failed to acknowledge. For 
Blair, one top  Downing Street aide observed, the party in the past had been   too 
‘hung up about  monopoly public provision,  the  close involvement of  trade unions  
and public professional associations in  the  determining  of public policy’: in his view 
‘defending public service monopolies  was simply … a category error’ (interview, 
2007).  Downing Street became convinced  that in their present form  the public 
services were incapable of making effective use of the additional funding. They were  
seen, as one senior policy advisor recollected,  ‘as lumbering, over centralised and 
monolithic organisations incapable of responding with speed  and flexibility and with  
no self-sustaining mechanisms of improvement’ (interview Chris Ham, 2007). 
New Labour’s new diagnostic  frame clearly bore  the imprint of ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) theory: the language used in Osborne and Gaebler’s seminal 
text constantly recurs in its  pronouncements.   The old-style ‘bureaucratic model’ of 
public services which 'delivered the basic, no-frills, one-size-fits-all services'  was 
sorely wanting (Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 14). Whilst the state should remain  a 
crucial agency for the pursuit of public goals it could only do so  if it was radically 
reshaped, if it challenged bureaucratic feather-bedding and ‘producer interests’ and 
learned to be ‘entrepreneurial.’  Amongst the key characteristics of   this 
‘entrepreneurial governance’  were: the creation of markets or quasi-markets; the 
separation of purchaser from provider; the  utilisation of competition as a means for 
powering service improvements; accountability for performance against targets and 
the reconstruction of service users (and the general public)  as customers or 
consumers (Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 19-20;  See also  Stewart, 2003: 170). All of 
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these  themes were to emerge as central motifs in New Labour-style ‘modernisation.’ 
Key features included curtailing  the influence of supposedly self-interested service 
providers, a  focus on outcomes or delivery and the creation of a  'performance culture' 
based on rewards for success and penalties for failure (Faulkner, 2008: 233). 
Underpinning New Public Management  was the theory of  ‘public choice’. 
Public choice applied the principles of economic theory to the sphere of collective 
action.  In their social interactions, it is assumed, people are principally driven by self-
interest. Within the context of a market economy self-interest is reconciled with 
general welfare via  the mechanisms of choice and competition.  Because consumers 
can choose between alternative suppliers of goods, and services producers are 
under relentless pressure to satisfy their preferences the consumer is ‘sovereign’.  
Where, however, the supplier of a service is monopolised by one single producer  
and where, furthermore, this producer is highly organised (in trade unions and 
professional associations) and operates through a bureaucratic system of resource 
allocation then a real problem of  ‘producer control’ or ‘producer capture’ arises.  
The thesis of producer capture occupied a central role organising New 
Labour’s diagnosis of what it saw as the perennial and endemic weakness of  
monopoly public sector service delivery. Bureaucratic monopolies delivering uniform 
services rendered public organisations unresponsive to shifting public preferences, 
and solidified structures in which producer interests   took precedence over 
consumer needs.  In the market sector   if private firms failed to respond to ‘the 
immediate needs of demanding consumers’, Blair pointed out,  ‘they go out of 
business. They know   that poor service, lack of courtesy, massive delays, destroys 
their image and their success’ (Blair, 2001). But where public monopoly prevailed, 
those  offering   ‘a poor or a tardy service could continue do so with impunity; for 
those badly treated had nowhere else to go’ (Le Grand, 2006: 5).     
The conviction  that, in the absence of choice and competition, the public 
services lacked a ‘self-sustaining mechanisms of improvement’ – a recurrent and 
insistent Blair refrain (Barber, 2007: 335)  - reflected a major shift in thinking. In 
traditional Labour thinking  the  ‘public service ethos’ operated as precisely such a 
mechanism. Indeed, the notion of a deeply-implanted  ‘public service ethos’  
regulating  conduct in public sector  organisations (especially in healthcare and 
education) permeated Labour  thinking ‘about the motivation, character and moral 
importance of the public sector within the political community’ (Plant, 2003: 561). 
Because adherence  to the public service ethos – a combination of professional 
norms, respect for the public good and a sense of altruism – was sufficiently strong 
amongst most professionally-employed people in the public service (teachers, 
nurses, doctors, probation officers and so forth) they could generally be trusted to do 
their best to help the people they served.  They could be relied upon to   deliver  
services more equitably, to a higher standard and with more concern with user  need 
than people motivated primarily by self-interest and profit..  They were ‘knights’ not 
‘knaves’ (Le Grand, 1997: 155). 
The New Labour  Government by no means discounted the importance of a 
‘public service ethos.’ It acknowledged  that ‘the  public service ethos undoubtedly 
forms part of the motivation of professionals and others working in the public service’ 
but  - it was quick to add - ‘it is only  a part, with more self-interested or knavish 
concerns also playing a significant role. Indeed, when ‘self-interest and public 
spiritedness’ conflicted for public sector providers ‘it is far from clear that public 
spiritedness always dominates’   (Joint Ministerial Memorandum, 2005: 3.3.5). 1  It 
readily conceded that public servants were driven by factors other than immediate 
self interest – altruism, professionalism and so forth – yet, equally, it felt that ‘the 
                                                     
1
 As Robert Hill, a former senior Downing Street adviser, later  recalled ‘the government has 
tended to talk as though professionals were knights, …. But it has tended to act as though 
they were knaves’ (Hill, 2007: 247-8). 
 5 
public service’ was invoked    ‘to a degree, as a cover for the producer interests of 
professional associations and public sector trade unions.’ There was a  tendency 
amongst the Blairites  ‘to see self-interest as a key determinant  of behaviour within 
the public sector –  they were [drawing upon the terminology used by Le Grand, 
1997] knaves not knights’ (interview with Government advisor, 2007. See also 
PMSU, 2006: 59). As one former Downing Street aide crisply put it, despite much talk  
of the public service ethos,   ‘there was not much sense of service to the public’  
(interview, Geoff  Mulgan). 
In the past, Labour had tended to contrast opportunistic, self-seeking 
behaviour in the private sector with public spiritedness in the public. New Labour 
reframed the terms of the debate. The  real  challenge to effective  public sector 
performance no longer the threat of exposing them to market disciplines and 
pecuniary motivations but ‘professional domination of service provision’ (Blair, 2004). 
‘People in the public sector’, Blair declared in a much publicised speech , far from 
represented paragons of public virtue were too cautious,  unimaginative and  too 
reluctant to experiment - at a time when  ‘the private sector, in its reward and 
motivation, has moved on apace’ ( Blair, July 1999). Without the spurs of competition 
and  relentless  consumer pressure, public organisations lacked the incentive to  
modernise outdated work practices, utilise resources more economically and drive up 
standards of service.  Reflecting upon his extensive governmental experience, 
Charles Clarke  commented that professional associations  had too often ‘focused 
upon defense of their own short-term interests……Innovation and initiative have 
been rare and defensiveness and introversion are too often the norm’ (Clarke, 2007: 
134, 131. See also Hutton, 2007:  171).    
 
New Labour Diagnostic Frames (2) Social narrative formation 
 If the notion of public sector failure was central to New Labour policy learning, 
it was also embedded in a broader narrative   of social change.  A narrative involves 
story-telling: ‘We account for actions, practices and institutions by telling a story 
about how they came to be as they are and perhaps also how they are preserved’ 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 20). Social narratives, as the term is used here, are  
frames  which depict  social realities in such a way as to provide justification  for  a 
particular set of policies. Political  actors ‘use narrative story lines and symbolic 
devices to manipulate so-called issue characteristics’ -  whilst often claiming simply 
to be spelling  the facts. These narratives are important not only  because they propel  
issues onto the  political  agenda but  because of the way the assert the burden of 
action. (Stone, 1989: 282, 283). 
The central motif in Labour’s narrative  was the relentless advance of the 
consumer society and consumer culture – terms apparently used interchangeably.  
Public services, in the formative period after the war, a leading New Labour strategist 
maintains,  were created  ‘on the assumption of a uniform provision to a relatively 
compliant, homogenous population’ (Taylor, 2006: 17). The old model of the welfare 
state was,  for Tony Blair, ‘the social equivalent of mass production, largely  state-
directed and managed, built on a paternalist relationship between state  and 
individual, one of donor and recipient. Individual aspirations were often  weak, and 
personal preferences were a low or non-existent priority’ (Blair, 2002).    ‘Old Labour’  
adhered to a  ‘one size fits all’  model in which the task of determining people’s needs 
could safely be left to  publics sector professionals. ‘The public  (Health secretary 
Alan Milburn observed) ‘were supposed to be truly grateful for what they   were about 
to receive. People expected little say and experienced precious little choice’ (Milburn, 
2003). 
By a  ‘consumer society’ New Labour appeared to  mean a society in which     
a mass of often high quality consumer goods and services   offering multiple choices 
were readily available and  highly competitive markets  ensured that producers 
exhibited  an acute sensitivity to consumer preferences. Its emergence was deemed 
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to have fundamentally altered mass culture.  The  ‘revolution in business’, David 
Miliband  observed, ‘has found its way into social norms’  (quoted in Cutler , Wane 
and Brehony,  2007:  848).  With solidaristic or communal  modes of thought  and the 
collectivist forms of organisation which sustained in irrevocable decline the  new spirit 
was  one of individual  aspiration and ambition, embodied in the concept of the 
confident,  discriminating  consumer. The experience of being able to choose 
between a wide range of goods and services proffered by rival suppliers all vying for 
their custom had raised popular  expectations  ‘Ordinary consumers are getting a 
taste for greater power and control in their lives. They expect services tailored to their 
individual needs. They want choice and expect quality’ (Milburn, 2007: 8).  
  As Vidler and Clarke point out, ‘this conception of the modern world being 
dominated by the practices and experiences of a consumer culture is central to New 
Labour's articulation of the case for public service reform’ (Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 
21).  Consumerism  furnished the dominant frame of reference in which people 
defined and enacted their social roles.   In the words of the   PM’s Strategy Unit,  ‘in 
light of their private sector experiences, the public want greater choice over the 
services provided to them by the state.  …..The public now expect services to be 
specifically appropriate to them’ (PMSU, 2007: 18). A second related axiom was that  
the private sector was decidedly  more effective than the public (as traditionally 
constituted)  in supplying individual needs to a high standard of service. Hence the 
constantly reiterated observation that people wanted better public services because 
they were ‘accustomed to high standards in commercial markets’  (PMSU, 2007: 
2.6). Precisely why this should be regarded as axiomatically given the serious cases 
of mis-selling of financial products (private pensions, endowment mortgages, high 
levels of bank overdraft charges), poor quality of rail services and often curt 
treatment of passengers by airlines   is a matter of some puzzlement. 2   
A central New Labour proposition was that if the welfare state failed to adapt 
to the demands of the new consumer culture its very legitimacy would be 
jeopardised. People would only support schemes of collectively-provided services if  
they could be shown to work to their advantage and that of   their  families.    The 
welfare state -  the provision of needs through public services   - could only  continue 
to command popular support to the extent that it demonstrated a sensitivity to 
increasingly powerful and pervasive individual aspirations and expectations  
(interview,  senior Downing Street advisor 2007).  Here a particular danger was that   
of the defection of sections of the middle class to the private sector (especially 
healthcare and secondary education). This would, one Blairite minister declared,  put  
at risk   ‘universal provision funded through general taxation’  and  ultimately lead  to  
‘the break up of public service provision as we know it today’ (Byers, 2003).  The 
danger was especially pressing in the more highly-populated – and  marginal rich - 
South Eastern England. Whilst  it was estimated that 12 per cent of the population 
had private health insurance this figure rose to as high as 30% in the  South East 
(Mohan, 2003).  The figures for private education were, respectively, 7% in England, 
but three times as much in parts of London. Middle class flight to the private sector 
would  thus at one and the same time damage the fiscal basis of the welfare state, 
deligitimise its institutions  and erode Labour’s electoral base.   ‘From this 
perspective, offering choice is one way in which we can bind into the public sector 
those that can afford to go private’ (Byers, 2003).  
 
 New Labour’s Prescriptive Frames (1) choice and empowerment.  
                                                     
2
 It was rare for this proposition to be queried. However one former senior Prime Ministerial 
advisor did point out that ‘many of the biggest private firms – such as the retail banks or cable 
companies, which operate in relatively oligopolistic markets – provide often dire standards of 
service that would be unacceptable in the public sector’ (Mulgan, 2007: 182). 
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Such were the diagnoses.  What  policy prescriptions flowed from them? Blair 
summed up his broad credo for public service reform thus: 
‘We must develop an acceptance of more  market-oriented incentives with a 
modern,  reinvigorated ethos of public service. We should  be far more radical 
about the role of the state as regulator rather than provider, opening up   
healthcare for example to a mixed economy under  the NHS umbrella….  We 
should also stimulate new  entrants to the schools market’  (Blair, 2003).  
  We have already noted that many of the characteristic principles and motifs of 
New Public Management (NPM) were assimilated into  the Blair Government’s 
discourse and policies.  This did not imply the adoption of a free market, new right 
approach. The New Labour programme of public service reform was – to the contrary 
-  grounded in a firm commitment to a large and vibrant sphere of collective activity 
where  public goods such as healthcare and schooling  were provided in an equitable 
fashion according to need, free at the point of consumption and funded by 
progressive taxation (PMSU, 2007:  10).  But – in a sharp break with traditional 
Labour thinking -  it did demand a recasting of the welfare state, through  the injection 
of both consumer choice and competition. Though these constituted two faces of the 
same phenomenon, for purposes of analytical exposition choice and competition.will 
be treated separately.  
  Choice, the Government explained, had two aspects. It was ‘both a means of 
introducing the right incentives for improving services for users, and .. a desirable 
outcome in and of itself: that is, it is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable’  
(Joint Ministerial Memorandum, 2005: para 1.2)  As an end, because   there was a 
strong and growing demand for choice. ‘While people have become more 
empowered as consumers they have not as yet become empowered as citizens. 
….Ordinary consumers are getting a taste for greater power and control in their lives’ 
(Milburn, 2007: 7-8).  An older social democratic  vocabulary which associated 
freedom and autonomy with the concept of self-development   has here  been subtly 
displaced by an emphasis on freedom as the extension of choice in competitive 
markets: ‘the consumer exercises personal autonomy through the freedom to 
choose’  (Needham, 2003: 21). Choice was, equally, seen as indispensable to 
‘personalisation’ which developed, from Blair’s second term, as a major theme of 
policy. Personalisation  was defined as ‘the process by which services are tailored to 
the needs and preferences of citizens.’   (PMSU, 2007: para 5.1). This could be 
achieved by a range of  means, including enhanced user  voice (individual and 
collective) but the Government’s main emphasis was on extending choice on the 
grounds that ‘it is difficult to see how personalisation can be implemented without 
choice’ (Joint Ministerial Memorandum, 2005: para 3.6.2). 
 
 However it was increasingly the ‘instrumental’ aspects of choice -  ‘acting as 
an instrument for achieving other desirable social ends’  (Joint Ministerial 
Memorandum, 2005: para  3.3.1)  - that  received most attention. Choice would  act 
as the spur to bolstering public service quality and efficiency and ensure much 
greater sensitivity to people’s needs by  fundamentally altered power relations 
between service users and providers. It imparted strong inducements  for changes in 
provider behaviour. As Blair explained,  
‘choice isn’t an end in itself. It is one important mechanism to ensure that 
citizens can indeed secure good schools and health services in their 
communities. Choice puts the levers in the hands of parents and patients so 
that they as citizens and consumers can be a driving force for improvement in 
their public services’ (Guardian, 24 June 2004)  
But to have these effects, choice had to be yoked to competition. 
 
New Labour’s Prescriptive Frames (2) consumer empowerment through 
competition  
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 ‘On its own’, the PM’s Strategy Unit averred,  choice would engender 
insufficient pressure for sustained service  improvements ‘but, coupled with 
competition, choice can provide powerful and continuing incentives for service 
providers to improve efficiency and raise service quality for all’ (PMSU, 2006: 66). 
One senior advisor was insistent on this point: ‘the crucial point  in generating 
sustained improvement in service quality is having competition, some from the 
private sector, most within the public sector‘ (interview, 2007)  Another senior advisor 
observed: ‘competition will promote an appetite for adopting best practice which has 
sadly been lacking  until now.  The policy of urging people to adopt best practice via 
information has had  disappointing results. By linking failure … with [financial] 
consequences  a  dynamic which  will have a positive effect on the system as a 
whole has been created’ (interview, 2006). Thus where  choice was coupled with  
competition, and where, in addition,  funding follows users’ choices, providers  would 
be under constant pressure to cut costs, avoid waste, raise quality and responds  to 
individual preferences.   Milburn put it this way: 
 ‘Where people can opt for a hospital where the waiting times are shorter and 
where money follows patient then he is empowered. The hospital  losing 
patients  then has a choice – to continue to under perform or improve: getting 
doctors working as they should be and therefore getting patients back’   
(interview, 2006).  
  New Labour policy-makers were genuinely attached to the precept that ‘what 
matters is what works’ but, equally were convinced – as Michael Barber,  highly 
influential head of the Downing Street Delivery Unit  put it – as ‘competition drives 
productivity improvement in other sectors of the economy, so why not in the public 
services?’ (Barber, 2007: 335). For New Labour, a policy advisor commented, the  
‘presumption was that  choice and competition operated as the most effective and 
reliable drivers of improvement, efficiency and innovation’ (interview,  2007).  Choice 
within a competitive system, Health minister John Hutton pointed out,   would  ‘throw 
a spotlight on poor performance, …drive inappropriate costs out of the system and 
… match capacity in the system to where people want it to be’  (Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2005  Ev 150).  To be effective, however, competition within 
existing  public sector institutions would not  suffice: what was needed was  ‘a broad 
base of suppliers’ (PMSU, 2007: 44). An essential aspect of a properly-functioning 
market was the entry of new, innovatory competitors who could provide additional 
capacity, inject new ideas, disturb cosy and established rhythms  of behaviour and 
frighten existing producers, thereby  forcing them to compete more fiercely for 
custom   (Le Grand, 2006).   New entrants , for the most part,  could  realistically only 
come from the private and (to a lesser degree) voluntary sectors.  A central tenet of 
New Labour thinking was  that  public services did not   have to be delivered by 
public organizations. What mattered was what worked, and what worked was 
intensified competition from new suppliers. Increased diversity of supply, one top 
Prime Ministerial aide emphasised, would ‘prevent the damaging effects of 
monopoly’ by facilitating new entrants to the market and thereby ensuring effective 
competition (interview, 2007).  The Office of Public Services Reform  was confident 
that ‘widening the market to create more suppliers of public services’  - greater  
‘contestability’ in the jargon –  would ‘drive up performance, improve  the quality of 
management and secure more  value for  money.’  It was vital for productivity growth 
since  ‘in the private sector as much as half of all productivity gains come from new 
entrants to the market, as opposed to incremental improvements from existing 
companies’  (OPSR, 2002: 24). All this constituted open defiance of one of Labour’s 
traditional totems but Tony Blair was absolutely adamant. ‘Part of any reform 
package’ had to be ‘partnership with the private or voluntary sector’ (quoted in 
Seldon, 2007:   69).  
 Choice, one staunchly New Labour minister pronounced, ‘should 
always be regarded as the default in public service delivery, because choice can 
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promote equity as well as improve quality’ (Hutton, 2007:  171). But this was a 
contentious proposition. Much of the resistance within the party to the consumerist 
agenda revolved around its impact on equity. Critics argued that choice and 
competition mechanisms would inevitably skew services in favour of the more 
knowledgeable, educated and confident. ‘The articulate and self-confident middle 
classes’, Roy Hattersley contended,  ‘will insist on the receipt of the superior 
services. The further down the income scale a family comes, the less likely it is to 
receive anything other than the residue which is left after others have made a choice’ 
(Hattersley, 2005).   The Government riposted that monopoly was a larger cause of 
inequality than choice.  The absence of choice, former Downing Street advisor Julian  
Le Grand reasoned, placed a premium on the ability to deploy ‘voice’ – in which the  
‘more articulate, more confident, and more persistent’ middle class had a decided 
advantage (Le Grand, 2006a). Typically lower income groups were less able to 
navigate the system, less confident in dealing with professionals, with ventilating 
their dissatisfactions and  utilising  complaints procedures. ‘The voice of the poor is 
generally much quieter than that of the middle class’  (Joint Ministerial Memorandum, 
2005: para 3.5.3). Furthermore, the more affluent sections of the middle class always 
enjoyed the option of choice by buying into privately-supplied healthcare and 
education: the  Government was giving to all the opportunities of choice which had 
until now been the prerogative of the wealthier (Blair, 2003). This said, the 
Government acknowledged that  ‘extending user choice of provider may create some 
problems for the exercise of choice by the less well off’ but believed that these could 
be remedied by establishing choice advisors and mandating public authorities to 
ensure a steady flow of reliable guidance and information  (Joint Ministerial 
Memorandum, 2005: para 3.5.6).   
 
Consumer choice and the collective good 
This final section considers some of the ambiguities and problems within   
New Labour’s consumerist narrative. Choice, the PM’s Strategy Unit opined, would  
‘allow users to become more assertive customers and help to ensure that public 
services respond more promptly and precisely to their needs’  (PMSU, 2006: 65. Itals 
added). There are two key assumptions in this seemingly unremarkable statement. 
The first is that  that what people wanted and what people needed where broadly the 
same. Thus one influential document  called for services to be refocused on ‘the 
needs of the patients, the pupils, the passengers and the general public’ whilst also 
urging ‘new ways of responding to customer demands’ (OPSR, 2002: 8, 19). The 
second assumption was that what people wanted, on aggregate, could broadly be 
equated with social need, or the common good. Both suggest a growing permeation 
of New Labour thinking by market discourse with its accent on needs as consumer 
preferences. 
In reality, the Government’s position was more ambiguous. The public 
services have always pivoted around some  notion of objective need, traditionally 
defined by a combination of  professional judgment and democratic deliberation and 
this remained the case with New Labour, as seen in its repeated avowal to  ensure 
that key services such as healthcare and schooling remained  free and available 
according to need. Indeed one of the central distinctions between a  quasi- and a 
real market was that, in the former,   priorities would be established by public 
authorities as agents for service users rather than by the users themselves acting as 
consumers in the marketplace.  
But, it was by no means always  consistent for there was a tendency to  elide 
the distinction between wants and needs. Thus the Government  defended its  drive 
to render the public services more consumer-oriented on the grounds  that  allowing  
‘users to become more assertive customers’  would ‘help to ensure that public 
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services respond more promptly and precisely to their needs’  (PMSU, 2006: 65. 
Italics added).  The more   ‘assertive consumer’   with  ‘instant access to information’ 
was, it was claimed, capable of  making  ‘instant choices according to their own 
priorities’ – assumed to correspond to their needs  (PMSU, 2007: 16). The passive 
‘pawn’ (in Le Grand’s terminology) of traditional state-oriented  social democratic was 
being transformed into  the ‘queen’ – the ‘empowered user’.  
There certainly was a considerable body of evidence indicating that people 
resented being treated as pawns, desired more personalised and sensitive forms of 
service delivery and experienced  choice  as empowering   (Le Grand, 2007). But 
were there not more tensions between individual wants and needs, and even more 
between (aggregated) personal preferences and the social good than the 
Government was prepared to concede? One can here  identify a range of problems.     
The first arose from  the fact of scarcity or relative inelasticity of supply. In the private 
sector supply could expand to meet rising demand with  price regulating the 
relationship between the two.  But the price mechanism did not operate in the quasi-
market and, with services free at the point of consumption demand for high-quality 
services  was more or less infinite: it  will never be possible to satisfy all education 
and healthcare needs and expectations – the costs would be astronomical.  
Therefore some form of rationing is inevitable. Indeed a central plank of the case for 
public services has always been that, in a situation of limited resources, availability 
should be  determined by need rather than price, that this requires some criteria of 
priority and that what these should be would best be left to a combination of  those 
with professional expertise and those with some form of democratic mandate.  
Inevitably, this meant that difficult decisions had to be taken.  As Walsh pointed out,   
‘decisions over the allocation of public goods typically have to take account of  
‘problems of conflicting rights, differences between individual and collective rights, 
and differences of the long and the short-term impact of the exercise of rights’  
(Walsh, 1995: 254). The result would always be an uneasy and contested  
equilibrium – but would this not be further unbalanced by a much-enlarged role for 
consumers? 
Furthermore, unlike in the conventional consumer market, in the resource-
constrained public sector  the exercise of  choice  by one set of individuals could 
have an adverse effect on others. This was particularly the case were services 
operated as position goods, that is a matter of securing a competitive edge rather 
than being valued ends in themselves. As the Education and Skills Select Committee 
pointed out, ‘in oversubscribed schools, the satisfaction of one person’s choice 
necessarily denies that of another’ (Education and Skills Select Committee, 2005: 
31).  As parents sought to do their best for their   children there would be an ever 
more intense scramble for limited places in the more highly-regarded and more 
effectively performing (in terms of league tables) schools. As a result, as the 
Committee noted in an earlier report, ‘far from being an empowering strategy the 
school admissions process, founded on parental preference, can be a time-
consuming cause of much distress in the lives of many families’ 
(Education and Skills Select Committee, 2004: 3). 
In addition, the aggregated preferences of sets of consumers may not 
necessarily conform with broader public purposes or indeed may have negative 
social consequences, which individuals themselves might not favour. As Needham 
points out, ‘a customer care ethos restricts public services to a mechanism for 
satisfying individual wants, ignoring the importance of such services in meeting 
collective goals’ (Needham, 2006:  857). For instance it seems not all unlikely that 
the impact of greater parental choice in the schooling system will be the intensifying 
of social, religious and ethnic segregation which might, in turn, weaken social 
cohesion and exacerbate social problems. The ‘aggregate of individual choices’   
might  not, in short, correspond to ‘collective priorities ‘ (Vidler and Clarke, 2005: 35). 
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Finally, and paradoxically the effect of policies which were avowedly 
designed to sustain the legitimacy of public services might  actually undermine them 
– by unleashing the consumerist genie.  Evoking a consumerist mentality might well 
raise expectations which cannot  be realistically fulfilled. ‘Rather than delivering a 
satisfied and pliable citizenry, consumerism may be fostering privatised and 
resentful citizen-consumers’ (Needham, 2003:  33). Would not the relentless 
emphasis  on consumer rights  - encouraging people to demand that their  needs be  
met  as quickly as possible irrespective of the impact upon others – legitimate  a 
more or less exclusive concern with  individual (or family) interests at the expense 
of any consideration of the community as a whole?  Might it not give rise to   
‘consumption risk’ whereby ‘users may develop unrealistic and even improper 
demand of provision’ and exhibit  ‘more demanding and display more assertive and 
even aggressive and bullying behaviour against providers’ if there demands are not 
met? (Gray, 2007: para 18). Might not the effect of promoting what Bunting has 
called ‘a pathology of social entitlements’ be to  erode yet further  sentiments  and 
ties of  social solidarity? (Guardian Jan. 28 2008). 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has revolved around an examination of New Labour’s consumer 
narrative – the way in which it has framed issues of public service delivery in terms of 
maximising individual consumer choice.   Traditionally Labour had viewed  public 
services not only as  a collective  way of  providing for individual  material security but 
as affording an   institutional framework  which would being people together, 
strengthening social bonds.  For New Labour, in contrast,  the role of the consumer 
has increasingly come to define mass aspirations and expectations in all walks of life. 
A market-oriented programme of public sector reform is thus  presented as a 
response to powerful social forces to which the Government has to respond if the 
welfare state – understood here as public services universally delivered, free at the 
point of use and financed by progressive taxation – is not to forfeit its legitimacy.    
  The end here was not – as with the new right -   small government and an 
enlarged role for the market as supplier of public goods. Rather it was big 
government reinvigorated by market mechanisms – by competition and choice. This 
meant repudiating what was dubbed ‘one-size-fits all’, that is a system of monopoly 
public provision in which  professionals are entrusted with considerable power to 
determine need and how it best can be met. For New Labour consumer choice and 
competition were essential means   for achieving   more efficient  and higher quality  
service. It was also deemed to be inevitable if the welfare state was to adapt to new 
social challenges:  ‘We live in a consumer age. Services have to be tailor-made not 
mass-produced, geared to the needs of users not the convenience of producers’   
(Department of Health, 2000: 2.12).  
This chapter concluded with some observations suggesting that the equation 
of consumer demand with individual needs and the public good might be a little more 
problematic than the Government acknowledged.    An approach which ‘allows the 
user to shape services through expressing a preference and making a choice’, as 
Needham points out, has a ‘potentially radical implications for public service 
provision’ (Needham, 2006:  853) and – one can add – for Labour’s future as a party 
indelibly associated in the public mind with the collective  provision of  services. What 
these will be only time will tell. 
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